

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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January 31, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM H. A. KISSINGER *K*

SUBJECT: Actions Resulting from the National Security Council Meeting
of January 29, 1969

Attached is a list of the actions indicated during the NSC meeting on Wednesday, January 29, 1969 dealing with the NPT. The list has been coordinated on an Eyes Only basis with the principals and has been agreed to by them. With your approval I will prepare appropriate implementing instructions where required. Obviously most of the actions are already underway. However, your views on the future treatment of other non-nuclear countries, expanded U. S. security guarantees and U. S. PLOW-SHARE capabilities should be formalized by appropriate written follow-up Study or Decision Memoranda.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Other _____

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List of Actions Resulting from
Meeting of the National Security Council
on January 29, 1969

The President decided to go forward with U.S. ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The following scenario of time-phased actions was approved with the view toward having the Secretary of State prepare, by Monday, February 3, 1969, a Presidential message to the Congress confirming his decision:

1. The Secretary of State and the Assistant for National Security Affairs will coordinate in informing the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) of our decision to proceed, while clearly assuring them that we will continue to reject Soviet claims that the UN Charter will permit Soviet intervention in the FRG. The FRG is to be informed prior to February 5, 1969.
2. The Secretary of State and Assistant for National Security Affairs will coordinate in informing the Soviet Charge of our decision to proceed with the NPT. The Soviets are to be informed prior to February 5, 1969.
3. The Secretary of State should discuss the proposed course of action with Senator Russell and other appropriate Congressional leaders prior to February 5, 1969.

For the present, the U.S. public stance with respect to the NPT should be that it is still being given consideration by the President and the National Security Council.

The President wishes it clearly understood that associated with the U.S. decision to proceed with the NPT there will be no efforts by the U.S. Government to pressure other nations to follow suit, especially the Federal Republic of Germany. In this regard, the U.S. Government should reflect a tone of hopefulness that other nations will sign or ratify while avoiding any intimation of heavy-handed pressure or arm twisting.

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While recognizing the concerns of non-nuclear countries for new or expanded U.S. security guarantees, the President does not wish any public intimation that existing commitments have been modified. In this regard, the President wishes this issue to be decided when the need arises, based on the circumstances extant at the time. U.S. ratification or support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not be interpreted as a broadening of U.S. commitments abroad.

The President expressed his intention of moving rapidly on the development of U.S. Plowshare capabilities and directed his Assistant for National Security Affairs to provide him, at an early date, with recommendations as to whether or not amendments to the Test Ban Treaty will be required to achieve this objective.

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